Robert S. Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Robert S. Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp. : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., No. 18131 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2769
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT s. FREDERICKSEN, aka 
ROBERT S. FREDERICKSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KNIGHT LAND CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18131 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
On Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court 
of Summit County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Peter F. Leary, Presiding 
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main Street 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Edward w. Clyde 
Ted Boyer 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED 
APR 14 1982 
~···-····-----.-..--------------------···--
Clerk. Supreme Court. Uta~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT s. FREDERICKSEN, aka 
ROBERT S. FREDERICKSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KNIGHT LAND CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18131 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
On Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court 
of Summit County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Peter F. Leary, Presiding 
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main Street 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Edward w. Clyde 
Ted Boyer 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF CASE ••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT. 
• • • • • • • • 
THE FACTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ARGUMENT. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I• 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
THE GENERAL LAW • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE THE MONEY PAY-
MENTS WAS BARRED. • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ANY RIGHT APPELLANT MIGHT HAVE HAD TO 
RECEIVE PROPERTY FROM RESPONDENT IS 
BARRED, BOTH BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS AND BY THE NINE AND ONE-HALF YEARS 
DELAY IN ELECTING TO CLAIM LAND • • • . • 
APPELLANT IS IN ERROR IN REFERRING TO 
HIMSELF AS A CO-OBLIGEE AND SETTLEMENT 
OF THE LAWSUIT WITH BUEHLER, ET AL, DID 
NOT TOLL THE STATUTE FOR APPELLANT •••. 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HIS SHARE OF 
AT LEAST 50% OF THE GROSS PROFITS FROM 
EACH AND EVERY SALE • • • . • • • • • . • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
APPELLANT WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO IN-
TEREST EVEN IF HIS CLAIMS WERE NOT 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS •• • • • • • • • 
CONCLUSION. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Page 
1 
1 
1 
7 
7 
8 
13 
19 
21 
24 
25 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Bjork v. April Industries, 547 P.2d 219 (Utah 
1976), appeal after remand 560 P.2d 315, 
cert. den. 97 s.ct. 2634, 431 u.s. 930, 53 
L. Ed • 2d 2 4 5. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Dixon v. Bartlett, 176 Cal. 572, 169 P. 236 
( 1 9 1 7 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
501, 177 P. 1019, 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
Elmore v. Fanning, 85 Kan. 
38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 685 ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hiscock v. Hiscock, 240 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1932) •••• • • • • 
Holloway, et ux v. Wetzel, 
P.2d 465 (1935) ••••••• 
86 Utah 387, 45 
• • • • • • • • • 
Kimball v. McCornick, 80 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 • 
Krause v. Spurgeon, 256 s.w. 1072 (Mo. App. 
---------------
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
1923) •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
McKennon v. McKennon, 231 P. 91 (Okla. 1924) •• 
Shadron v. Cole, 101 Ariz. 122, 416 P.2d 555, 
supp. 101 Ariz. 341, 419 P.2d 520 ••••••• 
State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. 
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 494 P.2d 529 •••• 
State Tax Comm. v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 
100 P.2d 575 ••••••••••••••••• 
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 
60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 .••...••.... 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
40 A.L.R. 29 •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
II Williston on Contracts (3rd Jaeger Ed 1957) 
§ 1293. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
STATUTE CITED 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23 (1953) • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Page 
8 
20 
21 
20 
21 
7 
20 
20 
8 
7 
7 
7 
20 
7 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant Robert S. Fredericksen filed suit on a written 
contract against the Respondent and one James L. Knight, seeking 
to recover 129 acres of land, or if the land could not be con-
veyed, judgment for its current market value. As an alternative, 
the Appellant sought judgment for $11,000. Respondent defended 
on the grounds that the action, both as to land and money, was 
barred by the six-year statute of limitations. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The action against James L. Knight personally was dismissed 
by stipulation (Stip. ! 26, R. 243). As against Respondent, the 
court held that the action, both for land and money, was barred. 
THE FACTS 
The action on which this suit is based arose out of the 
fol lowing: Respondent Knight Land Corporation had in 1961 en-
tered into an option contract to purchase the 16,500 acre Jeremy 
Ranch in Summit, Salt Lake and Morgan Counties, State of Utah. 
Respondent sold 5, 000 acres of that land to a limited partner-
ship, Huntington Park Investment Company (Huntington Park}, in 
which the Appellant and others were limited partners. The part-
ners collectively contributed $120, 000 to Huntington Park for 
their partnership interests and it used the money as a down 
payment on the purchase of 5,000 acres. Respondent then used the 
$120,000 to make a payment under its contract. Huntington Park 
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only made the one payment and then defaulted. 
Appellant had contributed $10,000 to Huntington Park and 
under the 1963 agreement Respondent agreed to return that $10,000 
plus 10%, without interest, but only from the "gross proceeds" 
from the resale of lands released with payments made on the 
underlying contract. If from this source Appellant had not been 
paid in full by July 1, 1968, the contract·gave hirn the option to 
select land from land "theretofore released" at $85 per acre to 
satisfy the unpaid portion. No sums were ever paid on Appell-
ant's behalf and no land was ever conveyed. 
The Appellant made no effort to select land prior to Feb-
ruary 27, 1978. On that date Appellant, by letter, demanded an 
accounting and stated that Appellant had elected to take land 
under the terms of the 1963 agreement. Thereafter on March 22, 
1978, Appellant filed this suit. 
The parties submitted this matter to the trial court on a 
written stipulation of facts, to which a number of exhibits were 
attached and admitted in evidence. This stipulation ~n narrative 
form tells the story. It is lengthy and we will not repeat it 
here. However, the contract on which this action is based can 
best be understood if the reader first understands the reason why 
the contract was made, and how it interrelates with an earlier 
contract, under the terms of which Respondent held an option to 
purchase some 16,500 acres of land known as the Jeremy Ranch. We 
desire here only to make a background statement and will refer to 
the particular facts on which we rely as a part of our argument. 
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Under an option contract dated November 1, 1961 (admitted in 
evidence as Ex. A to the stipulation) (Stip. !l, R. 244), Respond-
ent obtained an option to acquire the Jeremy Ranch. Under this 
underlying 1961 contract, Knight Land could continue the option 
to buy in force only by making an annual payment. With each 
annual payment (which was due on November 1st of each year and 
was in the amount of $160,000, without interest) Respondent was 
entitled to have released from the contract and conveyed to it a 
specified amount of land. The earlier payments released a rela-
tively small amount of land, but thereafter Respondent was en-
titled to receive 1,600 acres of land with each $160,000 annual 
payment (Ex. A, 17). 
It is recited in par. 6(i) of the underlying contract 
(R. 248) that Respondent had already paid $60, 000 for an option 
to purchase the Jeremy Ranch from East Salt Lake Investment 
Company a partnership located in Phoenix, Arizona (East Salt 
Lake). The contract then provided that upon the signing of the 
contract on November 1, 1961, Respondent was to pay an additional 
$120,000. 
It is stipulated that this $120, 000 came from Huntington 
Park Investment Company, a limited partnership. The Articles of 
Partnership are attached to the stipulation as Ex. B (R. 265). 
As can be seen therefrom, Appellant was one of many limited 
partners in Huntington Park. Huntington Park had agreed to 
purchase 5, 000 acres from the 16, 500 acre tract originally con-
stituting the Jeremy Ranch (Stip. ~3(b), R. 232). The sum of 
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$120, 000 was paid by Huntington Park to Respondent as a down 
payment on that purchase agreement. Huntington Park did not make 
the next payment and the contract was terminated. Some of the 
1 irni ted partners made no effort to get their money back ( Stip. 
!5, R. 233). Others, including the Appellant, did. Appellant 
and nine others signed the agreement which is the basis of this 
suit. That agreement is attached to the stipulation as Ex. C. 
(R. 276). 
The agreement acknowledges that Respondent had no general 
obligation thereunder to pay Appellant (see Ex. C. i12, R. 282); 
the obligation to pay was limited to 50% of the gross profits 
realized from the resale of land released to Respondent when and 
if Respondent made payments on its underlying contract. It was 
also expressly acknowledged that Respondent had no obligation to 
continue to make those payments which were required to keep the 
1961 option contract in good standing; but if in Respondent's own 
self-interest, it elected to do so, then the parties acknowledged 
that with each such payment, Respondent would get a release of 
(title to) a tract of land (Ex. C. !7, R. 280) The 1963 contract 
with Appellant then gave Respondent two options. First, Respond-
ent could sell any released land. If it did so, it could retain 
the first $85 per acre to cover the cost of the land. Everything 
in excess of $85 per acre was considered to be "gross profits" 
and Respondent was to divide the gross profits on a 50-50 basis. 
The $85 per acre ties back into the underlying 1961 contract in 
this fashion--the total price under that contract was $1,400,000 
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and the land sold was approximately 16,500 acres, which divides 
out at just less than $85 per acre. It was recognized in Appell-
ant's contract that Respondent would have some attorney fees, 
title insurance and other costs of sale and Respondent was to pay 
these from its 50% share of the gross profits. The other 50% of 
the gross profits was to be paid to Security Title Company for 
the use and benefit of the Appellant and the others who signed 
the contract (Ex. C. !2(d), R. 277). 
As a second option, Respondent could elect to keep the land 
that had been released. If it did this, it was required by par. 
11 of the contract (Ex. C.) to give a mortgage to secure Respond-
ent's obligations to the Appellant and the others. Then, if 
Respondent had not sold enough of the released land by July 1, 
1968, so that 50% of the profits would be sufficient to pay off 
the ten people who signed the 1963 contract, they were then each 
individually given by Par. 3 the option to select land from land 
"theretofore released" at $85 per acre for the unpaid balance. 
If he preferred, Appellant could decline to select land and wait 
until the land was sold and be paid in money (Ex. C. !4, R. 278). 
The contract was signed in December of 1963. The next 
annual payment was made under the underlying contract on November 
1, 1964. The land released with that payment was immediately 
sold by Respondent for a price which the parties stipulated was 
greater than $85 per acre (Stip. !14, R. 239). There·was thus a 
"gross profit" and 50% thereof should have been paid to Security 
Title Company in November of 1964, but it was not. This first 
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breach thus occurred nearly 14 years before this suit was filed. 
Like payments were made under the underlying 1961 contract and 
land was released in 1965, 1966 and 1967 ~ and in each instance 
Respondent immediately sold the released land for a price greater 
than $85 per acre, but paid nothing to the escrow (Stip. !14, R. 
239). 
Respondent was unable to make the 1968 payment on its 1961 
option contract, but was able to induce one Elliott Wolfe to 
acquire the position of the seller (East Salt Lake) for the 
balance due under that contract. Mr. Wolfe did this and then 
gave Respondent an extension. At that time there were still 
12,500 acres of land which had not been released. That land was 
all sold in May of 1970. There was a $500,000 down payment, none 
of which was paid to the escrow for the benefit of the Appellant. 
All of the remaining 12,500 acres were conveyed at that time to 
the buyer and Respondent took back a trust deed and note for the 
unpaid balance (Stip. !8, R. 236). 
The 1963 contract did not fix a definite period of time 
within which the option to select land (which matured July 1, 
1968) had to be exercised, but the trial court found that the 
contract should be construed as requiring the election to be made 
within a reasonable time and that the effort by the Appellant to 
select land ten years later, in the Spring of 1978, was not 
timely (R. 394). By February, 197 8, Jeremy Ranch had been ac-
quired by a resort developer and a golf course and other improve-
ments had been constructed on part of it. The demand letter for 
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land was served on February 7, 1978, and the complaint was filed 
March 21, 1978 (R. 1). 
The trial court held that the suit was barred by the statute 
of limitations. We will undertake in the following argument -to 
demonstrate that this holding was correct. 
ARGUMENT 
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the contract and 
discussion of the stipulated facts, we think it will be helpful 
if we note the general law. 
I. THE GENERAL LAW. 
Sec. 78-12-23, U.C.A., 1953, provides that any action 
"founded upon an instrument in writing" must be brought within 
six years. The statute of limitations begins to run as soon as 
the contract is breached. See State Automobile & Casualty Under-
writers v. Salisbury, 27 Ut.2d 229, 494 P.2d 529; Kimball v. 
McCornick, 80 Ut. 189, 259 P. 313. In fact, nonperformance of 
contractual duties gives rise to a cause of action as soon as 
there is a day's delay in the performance beyond the period 
stipulated in the contract, II Williston on Contracts (3rd Jaeger 
Ed. 1957), § 1293, p. 28; and demand for performance is not 
necessary when both parties have equal knowledge of the contract 
provisions regarding the various options available for non-per-
formance. See a 1 so M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety 
Co., 60 Ut. 435, 211 P. 998, which holds that the statute begins 
to run for breach of contract when the breach occurs, and State 
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Tax comm. v. Spanish Fork, 99 Ut. 177, 100 P.2d. 575, which holds 
--- ~ 
that the statute begins to run when the debt is due and payable. 
The fact that the prorni se is in the a 1 terna ti ve (to give 
land or to pay money) does not change the general rule. See 
Shadron v. Cole, 101 Ariz. 122, 416 P.2d 555, supp. 101 Ariz. 
341, 419 P.2d 520; Bjork v. April Industries, 547 P.2d 219 (Ut. 
1976), appeal after remand 560 P.2d 315, cert. den. 97 S.Ct. 
2634, 431 U.S. 930, 53 L.Ed.2d 245. 
II. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE THE MONEY PAYMENTS WAS BARRED. 
The parties have stipulated that when Respondent made a pay-
ment under the 1961 option contract, it thereby secured the 
release of land (Stip. !6, R. 235). We have stipulated that the 
payments were made in 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967 and with each 
payment land was released (Stip. !7, R. 236). We have stipulated 
... 
that the land thus released with each of those payments was 
immediately sold for a price in excess of $85 per acre (Stip. 
!14, R. 239), thus, in every case generating a gross profit. The 
1963 contract upon which this suit is based, required Respondent 
to divide the gross profits on a 50-50 basis, with 50% being paid 
into escrow for the benefit of Appellant and others. The parties 
have stipulated that this was not done (Stip. !14, R. 239). 
There was thus a clear breach of the promise to pay money which 
occurred in November of 1964, nearly 14 years before this action 
was filed. 
The gross profits from that 1964 sale would not alone have 
been enough to pay in full the Appellant and the others who 
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signed the contract, but the right to receive his share of the 
gross profits from this November, 1964, sale was barred in Novem-
ber, 1970. Like gross profits were generated in November of 
1965, 1966 and 1967 and Appellant's rights to those were barred 
in 1971, 1972 and 1973, respectively. 
A sale of the 12,500 remaining acres was made (by Wolfe, who 
held title, and by Respondent who still held the 1961 contract) 
on May 1, 1970. That sale was closed by the purchaser paying 
$500,000 in cash and giving a note and trust deed for the 
$1,600,000 balance. All of the remaining lands, consisting of 
12,500 acres were conveyed to the purchaser at that time (Stip. 
!10, R. 237). The stipulation included an Ex. H. (R. 311), which 
shows how the $500,000 was disbursed. Copies of the checks used 
in making the disbursement are al so attached. From this down 
payment, Respondent paid the balance that was due to Wolfe. It 
used part of the money to negotiate the release of some judgments 
as necessary to clear the title and there was $123, 855. 02 left 
over. This was paid to the Respondent by two checks--one for 
$110,000, dated June 2, 1970 (Check No. 55) and a second check 
for $13,855.02, dated June 24, 1970 (Check No. 63). The total 
amount owed under the 1963 contract was $78,500, plus 10% (Ex. C, 
!12, R.276-7). Thus, Respondent had left over from the $500,000 
payment in May, 1970, (after paying Wolfe and clearing the title) 
considerably more money than was necessary to pay all of them in 
full. It was, of course, all still due, because none of the 
gross profits from the 1964-1967 sales were paid to Appellant as 
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required. By at least June of 1970 there had been more than 
enough "gross profits", so that 50% thereof would have paid the 
contract in full, with a large amount to spare. The date for 
selecting land (July 1, 1968) had also long since gone by. Suit 
could have been filed then for all the relief Appellant now 
seeks. The statute barred the claim by June of 1976. 
Appellant now, confronted with the statute of limitations, 
wants the court to hold that Respondent was legally entitled to 
keep the entire $500,000 to recoup the cost of 12,500 acres at 
$85 per acre, and to thus postpone the right of the Appellant to 
receive any money until the later installments, some of which 
would fall due within his six-year statute of limitations period. 
However, there is no justification in either normal accounting, 
or under the specific terms of the contract for such a unique 
accounting approach. We are, after all,_ controlled by the con-
tract. It is the basis for the suit. Par. 13 thereof expressly 
deals with the rights of the parties on .,a sale of the Jeremy 
Ranch as an entirety, as distinguished from a sale of the indiv-
idual tracts released with annual payments. 
Appellant, on page 19 of his brief, quotes from par. 13(c), 
but in his discussion ignores the fact that the paragraph which 
provides for each installment to be shared "proportionately" only 
comes into play if the installment contract would be paid in full 
"before December 31, 1968". Par. (d) says that if the install-
ments go beyond 1968, Appellant would, nevertheless, be paid in 
full from "the sums so received by December 31, 1968". 
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In full, this par. 13 provides that if the Respondent does 
sell the Jeremy Ranch as an entirety and receives payment in full 
therefor, the Appellant and others uould be entitled to be paid 
in full forthwith. (See par. 13(b), R. 283). Par. 13(c) pro-
vides that if Respondent makes an installment sale, which under 
its terms would be paid off in ful 1 before December 31, 196 8, 
then the Respondent was to pay for the benefit of the Appellant 
and the others only a proportionate share of each installment 
payment. If the installments extended beyond December 31, 1968, 
par. 13(c) required Respondent to pay the Appellant and the 
others in full from the funds received before December 31, 1968. 
We submit that it is impossible in the face of this express 
contract language to conclude that the parties intended for 
Respondent to keep all of the early installment payments from the 
May, 197 0, sale and credit them to the recovery of the cost of 
the land and to require Appellant and the others all to wait 
until the end instal lrnents to get any of their payments. The 
installment contract did extend beyond December 31, 1968, and 
under the contract Appellant was entitled to his money from the 
early payments. As Appellant admits on page 24 of his brief, the 
parties contemplated that Appellant would be paid in full by land 
or money by December 31, 1968, and notes that the contract pro-
vided that Appellant would be paid without interest. Yet, be-
cause ·of his statute of liI!litations difficulties, he wants the 
court to ignore the clear language of the contract and to hold 
that Appellant legally had to wait until the 1974 final payment 
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to claim his money. That argument is simply contrary to the 
agreement on which he sues. We did have one unforeseen and thus 
uncontemplated development--Respondent could not make the Novem-
ber 1, 196 8, payment and did not get the expected 1, 6 0 0 acres 
released. However, the option contract was not forfeited, be-
cause Wolfe paid it off. and then granted Respondent an extension. 
This, however, did not cancel par. 13 of the agreement dealing 
with a sale of the whole ranch. 
Even if this two-year extension nullified par. 13 (where the 
parties attempted to deal expressly with the sale of the ranch as 
an entirety) and thus the contract is held not to have dealt with 
the problem, what Appellant is urging is contrary to normal 
accounting procedures. When an installment contract is made, the 
normal accounting procedure is to allocate each payment so as to 
recoup a proportionate share of the costs and a proportionate 
share of the profits from each payment. The $500,000 payment was 
24% of the agreed $2, 100, 000 purchase price. It normally would 
have been allocated to recoup 24% of the land costs for the 
acreage sold and the balance would be profits. That is the way 
this contract defines profits. The total sale covered 12,500 
acres; 24% of this would be 3,000 acres; $85 per acre on 3,000 
acres would be $255, 000 land cost in the down pyament. The 
balance ($245,000) would be gross profits. Half of these gross 
profits would be $122,500. This was much more than the total sum 
owed ($78,500 plus 10%) to all ten of the signatory parties. 
Thus, by May 1, 1970, we had had the gross profits from the four 
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sales in 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967; we then had the gross profits 
from the May 1, 1970, sale; and 50% of all of these gross profits 
far exceeded the total debt to the Appellant and the others under 
this contract. . 
We respectfully submit that the stipulated facts demon-
strate, without a doubt, that the right of the Appellant to 
receive his share of the gross prof its was first breached in 
1964, nearly fourteen years before the complaint was filed and 
that by May 1, 1970, nearly eight years before the complaint was 
filed, the Respondent was required by the terms of the contract 
to have paid the Appellant in full. The claim for payment of the 
$10,000, plus 10%, had fully matured by June of 1970, and the 
right was already barred when this action was filed in March of 
1978. The trial court so held. 
III. ANY RIGHT APPELLANT MIGHT HAVE HAD TO RECEIVE PROPERTY 
FROM RESPONDENT IS BARRED, BOTH BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND BY THE NINE AND ONE-HALF YEARS DELAY IN 
ELECTING TO CLAIM LAND. 
By the terms of the contract, the right to select land. 
matured July 1, 1968 (R. 7, ~3). It is stipulated that no elect-
ion to select land was made until the demand letter of February 
7, 1978, which is attached to the complaint (Stip. ~20, R. 241). 
This is nearly ten years after the right to select land first 
matured on July 1, 1968. If there had been land available (there-
tofore released and unsold) on July 1, 1968, so that the right to 
select land would come into play, the selection, in law, had to 
be made within a reasonable time. Even the cases cited by Appell-
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ant so hold. Nine and one-half years is not a reasonable time 
and the trial court so held ( R. 3 94) . By 1978 the Jeremy Ranch 
had been greatly improved with condos, a golf course, etc., and 
letting Appellant select these lands in 1978 at their 1961 cost 
of $85 per acre would be most unreasonable, and demonstrates the 
wisdom of a statute of limitations. Respondent sold all of the 
remaining land in May, 1970. Even if the right to select land 
were still in existence at that time, the promise to permit the 
selection of land became irrevocably impossible for Respondent to 
perform, because it was all sold and conveyed. The lower court 
so found (R. 394, 116). That conveyance occurred nearly eight 
years before this suit was filed and the claim to land is barred. 
We emphasize that the right to select land was expressly 
restricted by Appellant's contract to particular land--that is, 
land which had been "theretofore" released to Respondent through 
the making of the payments on the underlying contracts (Ex. c, 
!3, R. 278). Because this is criticial to the Appellant's argu-
ment and the contract is dispositive, we quote the pertinent 
language on this right to select. 
If Knight has not reimbursed each of the Parties of the 
First Part in full for all sums advanced by him, as 
aforesaid, plus 10%, by July 1, 1968, each or any of 
the Parties of First Part may request Knight to re-
convey to said requesting party sufficient of the 
acreage theretofore released to Knight from the Jeremy 
Ranch, at the rate of $85 per acre to fully satis-
fy. . . 
any remaining unpaid. balance. The Appellant's contract does not 
talk about after-acquired land or about land to be obtained by 
Respondent under some future contract, or for some different 
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consideration. By Par. 3 of Ex. C, the right to select land 
after July 1, 1968, was from land "theretofore released" under 
the 1961 Jeremy Ranch option contract. Even if Respondent had in 
fact reacquired and now owned land from what was once a part of 
the Jeremy Ranch, there is no contract language which would 
permit Appellant to select that land, either in 1968, when the 
right matured, or in 1978, when Appellant first elected to take 
land. If there is contract language showing that the parties so 
intended, Appellant ought to cite it to the court. The fact 
is--there is no such language. 
The nature of the present rights of Respondent in former 
Jeremy Ranch lands is covered in detail by par. 19 of the stipu-
lation (R. 240). Par. 19(a) recites that Respondent obtained 
title to ten acres of land in 1974 "from Emigration Land Company". 
Note: This land was acquired from East Salt Lake Investment 
Company, the 1961 seller; it was not land available in 1968 when 
the right to select matured; it was not land from which a select-
ion could ever have been made under the 1963 contract. Emigra-
tion Land Company had purchased all of the remaining Jeremy Ranch 
lands in May of 1970. Then we have stipulated, Respondent ac-
quired ten acres under a 1974 contract with Emigration Land 
Company--not under the 1961 contract. That land has been sold 
(Stip. !19(a), R. 240). In Par. 19(b), (R. 240), the parties 
stipulate that in May of 1978, Emigration Land acquired out of a 
foreclosure proceeding a 2% partnership interest in a limited 
partnership called "The Jeremy". It is stipulated that Respond-
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ent "subsequently" (that is, after May of 1978) acquired the 2% 
partnership interest in that limited partnership. Again, this 
interest did not come as a release of land under the 1961 con-
tract. It was not land released with the payments made thereon. 
It was not land available for selection in July of 1968, in 
accordance with the 1963 contract. It is not even land. The 
Jeremy is a limited partnership which presently owns the remnants 
of the Jeremy Ranch. It has developed the golf course and made 
other improvements. Emigration Land, which purchased all the 
remaining land in May of 1970, lost all the land in a foreclosure 
sale. The partnership (The Jeremy) acquired the land at fore-
closure sale in 1978, but Emigration Land was able to acquire a 
2% partnership interest. After May of 1978, Respondent acquired 
that 2% interest. It was acquired nearly ten years after Appell-
ant's right to select land matured. 
In par. 19(c) {R. 240) the parties stipulated that on June 
20, 1978, Emigration Land Company entered into an agreement with 
The Jeremy, a limited partnership, to purchase 180 acres. Res-
pondent acquired Emigration Land's interest in that contract. If 
the contract is hereafter performed, Respondent will at some 
future date acquire by purchase that 180 acres. Again, this 
acquisition by Emigration Land and then under contract by Res-
pondent, occurred ten years after the right to select land under 
the 1963 contract with Appellant had matured in 1968. It was not 
land released under the underlying 1961 contract. This contract 
interest did not even exist in 1968. How in the world can it be 
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argued, without tongue in cheek, that .. - this 180 acres, or any 
other newly acquired interest, is land that was open to selection 
in 1968 under the 1963 contract? The trial court expressly found 
that this was not the extent of the contract (Find. #4, R. 392 
and Find. #18, R. 394). 
The terms of· the contract control. The contract provides 
for only two sources of payment to Appellant. He could have been 
paid from 50% of the "gross profits from the sale of released 
land". If Appellant and others. had not been paid in ful 1 from 
50% of the "gross profits from the sale of released land by July 
1, 1968", the Appellant and any other signatory party to the 1963 
agreement could then each select average land at $85 per acre 
from land "theretofore released" for any unpaid portion (Ex. c. 
S[2, R. 278). 
In his brief (p. 24) Appellant argues and thus concedes that 
the parties intended that the agreement would be paid out by 
December 31, 1968 and since it was not, Appellant wants interest 
from that date. ·Appellant says: 
tion. 
• . .This Agreement and its obligations were obviously 
intended to be satisfied and fulfilled by December 31, 1968. 
It was not anticipated by the contracting parties nor is it 
reasonable to assume that Respondent should have had use of 
Appellant's $10,000.00 for more than 17 years with only 10% 
added thereto. (p. 24) 
The complaint and the letter reflect the same interpreta-
This, of course, is what we contend. If Respondent had 
made its payments under the underlying 1961 contract and had 
gotten the agreed land releases, there should have been adequate 
money and/or adequate land released to take care of the obliga-
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18 
tion to Appellant by December 31, 1968. The required payments 
were all made and the agreed land was released through 1967. 
Then one unexpected development occurred. Respondent could not 
make the 1968 payment and did not get the 1,600 acres which would 
have been released thereby. However, as noted above, Respondent 
induced Elliott Wolfe to pay the balance due under the 1961 
contract and take the position of the Seller. Mr. Wolfe then 
granted Respondent an extension. By the Spring of 1970 Respond-
ent had succeeded in selling all of the remaining land. (Stip. 
ilO, R. 237). The land was all conveyed. All the land was gone. 
If the right to select land was still in good standing in May of 
1970, it ceased to exist thereafter, because Respondent sold and 
conveyed it. The statute ran six years thereafter and this 
action was not filed until March of 1978. The trial court cor-
rectly held (1) that the claim to land is barred (R. 394); (2) 
that Appellant let his right to select land expire by letting 
nearly ten years go by without trying to exercise the July 1, 
1968, right to select land {R. 394); and (3) that the phrase 
"land theretofore released", as used in the 1963 contract, refers 
to land from the Jeremy Randh released to Respondent pursuant to 
the terms of the original contract of purchase (Find. #4, R. 392). 
Appellant, even if the claim were not barred, could not select 
land repurchased by Respondent in 1974 and 1978 at the $85 per 
acre c~st of the land in 1961. 
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IV. APPELLANT IS IN ERROR IN REFERRING TO HIMSELF AS A 
CO-OBLIGEE AND SETTLEMENT OF THE LAWSUIT WITH BUEHLER, 
ET AL, DID NOT TOLL THE STATUTE FOR APPELLANT. 
In approximately January of 1970 (well within the six-year 
limit) J. Kent Buehler, Richard D. Madsen and Owen L. Sanders, 
three of the ten people who originally signed the 1963 agreement 
filed suit against Respondent (Stip. ~5, R. 233). 
The parties to that suit arrived at a stipulated settlement 
on approximately June 21, 1974 (R. 234, ~5(c); R. 286, 290). The 
order of dismissal was signed June 28, 1974 (R. 286), and the 
satisfaction of judgment and the release of lis pendens was 
signed April 18, 1975 (R. 290, 291). Pursuant to that settlement 
Respondent paid cerbain moneys and transferred certain land to 
the adverse parties to that suit (R. 234, Stip. !5(a)). None of 
the parties to that lawsuit shared his recovery with Appellant or 
any of the other signatory parties to the 1963 agreement (Stip. 
~5 ( d) ) ; nor did they purport to sue on behalf of the others. 
Appellant clearly bases this claim on the assumption that Bueh-
ler, et al, were "co-obligees". He says so in his "Title" to 
this point on page 17 of his brief. The agreement in par. 15 
(Ex. C ilS, R. 284) expressly says they are not. 
Par. 15 provides that the ten First Parties (including 
Appellant) are not acting jointly, but each is acting separately 
and on his own behalf. Specifically, that paragraph says: 
It is mutually acknowledged that the First Parties are each 
acting on their own behalf, and that they are in no way 
associated one with the other. Payment will be made to each 
of the Parties of the First Part for his own account, and if 
any one or more of them selects to take land, it will be 
conveyed to each of the parties, or his nominee, in their 
individual names, and no one of the First Parties shall have 
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any interest in lands which are conveyed to any other one 
of the First Parties, it being mutually acknowledged that 
any association which may have existed between the First 
Parties has heretofore been cancelled and terminated. 
In view cf that express recital, there simply is no basis for 
arguing that the contract created joint obligees, nor that pay-
ment to Buehler, et al in 1975 would toll the running of the 
statute for the Appellant. In view of this par. 15, nothing else 
should be required to show that the parties were separate, not 
joint, but we note that the whole contract is consistent there-
with. If they were not paid by July 1, 1968, they were separate-
ly (each and any) given an option to select land or separately 
could wait and be paid money. They did not need to act in 
concert--one could take money, the other nine could each select a 
different tract of land of his own choosing. This is, of course, 
consistent with par. 15 of the contract, which says that the 
interest is separate. 
The cases cited by Appellant all are premised on that con-
cept of a joint obligation: Krause v. Spurgeon, 256 S. W. 1072 
(Mo. App. 1923), (payment to one of two joint holders of a note); 
Dixon v. Bartlett, 176 Cal. 572, 169 P. 236 (1917), (a letter to 
one partner acknowledging a partnership contract debt); Hiscock 
v. Hiscock, 240 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1932), (payment to one of several 
co-owners or holders of a mortgage). In McKennon v. McKennon, 
231 P. 91 (Okla. 1924), the court declined to toll the statute 
for one holder of a note, because of payment to the other holder 
of the same note because the interest was not joint. The Mc-
Kennon case is cited in an annotation in 40 ALR 29, which indi-
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cates some conflict in the cases, but we do not need to reach 
that problem here, because even the cases where payment to one 
party is held to toll the statute on behalf of another, have done 
so under a theory that the payment was to a partnership or on a 
joint obligation. 
This, we believe, is a complete and adequate answer, but 
there is still a further controlling factor and that is that the 
payment made to Buehler, Madsen and Saunders was not voluntary, 
and this was not an acknowledgment of the debt. Buehler, et al 
filed suit. There was a compromise settlement of that suit, 
which resulted in a j udgrnent. The payment was made in satis-
faction of that judgment, and the rationale for making payment 
start the limitation period over anew does not exist. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Holloway, et ux v. Wetzel, 86 Ut. 
387, 45 P.2d 465 (1935), cited with approval a Kansas case, 
Elmore v. Fanning, 85 Kan. 501, 177 P. 1019, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
685, which stated this rule as follows: 
A payment to toll the statute must be must under such 
circumstances as to amount to an acknowledgment of 
existing liability. 
We submit that element is lacking where a suit is filed, goes to 
judgment and payment is made in the satisfaction of judgment. 
V. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO HIS SHARE OF AT LEAST 50% OF 
THE GROSS PROFITS FROM EACH AND EVERY SALE. 
Appellant cites some cases and works out a theory which in 
ef feet asserts that the Appellant's contract right was only to 
receive his prorated share of each installment on the May 1, 1970, 
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sale of the Jeremy Ranch, and that since one large installment 
was paid in 1974, his prorated share of that installment is not 
barred by the six-year statute. The thing wrong with this theory 
is that it is not even approximately in accordance with the terms 
of the contract. The Appellant brought suit on a written con-
tract and his rights are controlled thereby. In that contract, 
Respondent and Appellant agreed that while Respondent was not 
obligated to continue making payments on the Jeremy Ranch, Res-
pondent, nevertheless, in its own self-interest could elect to do 
so (Ex. C !8, R. 280). With each payment Respondent would 
receive a tract of land (Ex. C !7, R. 280). If Respondent sold 
that tract for any sum greater than $85 per acre, the parties 
agreed that there would be a gross profit which should be divided 
at that time 50% to the Respondent and 50% to Appellant and the 
others who signed the contract (Ex. C. !2, R. 277). If the 
Respondent did not sell the land as it was released, he was 
obligated by par. 11, (R. 282) of the contract to give a mortgage 
to secure the ultimate payment to the Appellant and the others. 
If Appellant had not been paid in full from this arrangement by 
July 1, 1968, he could elect to select land, but only from land 
"theretofore released" for his unpaid balance (Ex. c. !2, R. 278). 
They also expressly agreed in the contract on how the payments 
would be made if Respondent sold the ranch as an entirety (Ex. 
C. !13, R. 283). 
As Appellant concedes (brief p. 24), the parties contem-
plated that Appellant would be paid in full in money and/or in 
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land by the end of 1968; but there was, of course, the possibil-
ity that Respondent would not make all or any of the payments and 
that the underlying contract would simply be forfeited. In that 
event it was expressly agreed (Ex. C. CJ[7, R. 280; also Ex. c. 
i12, R. 282) that Respondent would have no liability to Appellant 
and the others. 
It is obvious why the parties believed that the matter would 
conclude by December 31, 1968, and contracted accordingly. The 
annual installments under the underlying contract were $160 ,000 
each. If Respondent made the payments under the agreement as 
contemplated, there should have been adequate land and/or money 
to pay Appellant in full by the end of 1968. They so assumed and 
so agreed. 
The contract al so recognized in par. 13 that instead of 
securing annual releases and selling those lands tract by tract, 
the Respondent might at any time sel 1 the Jeremy Ranch in its 
entirety under an installment sale contract. Par. 13 then speci-
fies what will happen if that occurs, and it does not, we repeat, 
does not provide that Appellant will be required to take his 
proportionate share of installments paid after December 31, 1968, 
and wait to the end of an installment contract for his money. It 
provides to the contrary--that if the installment contract go out 
beyond 1968, Appellant was to get his money from the installments 
paid before that date. No one .anticipated that this would stretch 
out beyond 1968, because the contract had very definitive forfeit-
ure provisions. The contract was really only an option. If the 
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payment was missed, the option simply expired. Respondent was 
not obligated to make the payment. If it failed to do so, both 
Appellant and Respondent lost their rights. They were confronted 
by that very problem on November 1, 1968, but Wolfe paid the 
contract out, took over the position of seller and granted an 
extension. There is no reason why this extension of time would 
not be for the benefit of both Respondent and Appellant nor why 
par. 13, which governed the sale of the ranch in its entirety, 
should not continue to apply. The down payment made in May of 
1970 contained more than enough "gross profits" to pay the Appell-
ant in full and there is no reason why Appellant could not have 
done what Buehler, et al, did, that is, file suit in 1970 to get 
his money. Respondent had no legal right to change this and 
force A~pellant to wait for his money. His claim matured and he 
waited nearly eight years to sue. 
VI. APPELLANT WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO INTEREST EVEN IF HIS 
CLAIMS WERE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Appellant asserts that he is entitled to recover interest. 
The contract says precisely to the contrary. Par. 2 of the 
contract (R. 6) obligates Respondent to pay the Appellant only 
from specified funds the $10,000 Appellant had advanced, plus 10% 
but "without interest". Appellant would have the court read this 
language to mean "without interest until the date of maturity and 
. 
with interest at the legal rate after maturity". That is not 
what it says. It says "without interest". Then Appellant says 
interest should run from December 31, 1968, because by then the 
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debt had matured. If this is so, the statute necessarily runs 
from that date and the claim was barred on January 1, 1975. 
The statute and cases cited by Appellant only apply where 
the parties have not specifically contracted for the payment 
without interest. However, here this is all mooted by the fact 
that the claim is barred; if the court holds otherwise, then the 
contract should control. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held against the Appellant and the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
-el /3, day of April, 1982. 
Edward W. Clyde 
Ted Boyer 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
, 
By-~1~~~ ]J ~ 
Attorneys for Respoild\11t 
Knight Land CorporationJ 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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